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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
The Credit Union, after it had completed a non-judicial 
foreclosure of a Trust Deed on real property taken by it as 
primary security for a loan made to Phillips, and after the 
statutory time had elapsed for the Credit Union to sue Phillips 
for a deficiency, refused to reassign to Phillips a certain real 
estate mortgage and note due Phillips, together with all amounts 
due or to become due thereon, which Phillips had initially given 
to the Credit Union as additional security for said loan. The 
real property in said note and mortgage due Phillips being 
entirely different than that real property covered in the Trust 
Deed given the Credit Union by Phillips as primary security upon 
which said Credit Union foreclosed non-judicially. Phillips 
thereafter brought this action to compel the Credit Union to 
reassign to Phillips said real estate mortgage and note given as 
additional security. Phillips further sought to compel the Credit 
Union to pay over to him the amount of $27,800, which had been 
paid on said promissory note and mortgage assigned as additional 
security to the escrow agent collecting for Phillips on said Note. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Phillips filed a motion for partial summary judgment to 
have the note, mortgage and proceeds due and to become due thereon 
reassigned to him and the District Court granted his Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
At the same time the Credit Union made a similar motion for 
summary judgment and the same was denied. 
The Credit Union, after entry of the Order on summary 
judgment adverse to it, filed an interlocutory appeal to this 
Court, which refused to hear the same and remanded the case to the 
District Court. 
Phillips proceeded to enforce the summary judgment granted 
him and had the mortgage and note reassigned to him and collected 
all the funds owing to him thereon. 
That the District Court subsequently heard the matters 
remaining to be tried relating to damages and attorney fees 
claimed by Phillips, and the Court denied Phillips's claims 
therefor. The Credit Union thereafter appealed the first Order 
granting plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
FACTS 
The Credit Union, on or about the 18th day of November, 
1980, loaned $150,000 to Phillips and took as security therefor a 
Trust Deed and Note covering real property located in Tooele 
County, Utah. As additional security, Phillips assigned to the 
Credit Union a promissory note and mortgage due him covering 
different property than that described in the Trust Deed and Note 
given by Phillips to the Credit Union as primary security. Phillips 
thereafter failed to make the payments to the Credit Union as 
required by the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note, given it as 
(2) 
primary security, and as a result thereof the Credit Union sold 
the property described on the Trust Deed taken by it as primary 
security for the loan at a non-judicial foreclosure sale in Tooele 
County on the 29th day of April, 1986. That subsequent to said 
non-judicial foreclosure sale of said property the Credit Union 
failed to sue Phillips for a deficiency judgment within the 
statutory time required by §57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
Volume 6A, as amended. Subsequent to said time running, Phillips 
requested that the Credit Union reassign to him his note and 
mortgage that he had given to the Credit Union as additional 
security for the loan, together with any and all proceeds due or 
to become due thereon, and the Credit Union declined to honor 
Phillips request- Phillips thereafter sued the Credit Union for 
return of said documents together with all proceeds due and to 
become due thereon. Thereafter, the Credit Union filed an 
interlocutory appeal and the Supreme Court refused to hear the 
same and remanded the case to the lower court to resolve the 
remaining issue, to-wit: damages, if any, suffered by Phillips 
because of the Credit Union's refusal to deliver the documents in 
question, together with the funds represented thereby and said 
District Court, after a hearing on the issue of damages, denied 
Phillips claim therefor. 
All of the foregoing facts are admitted by the Credit 
Union's pleadings on file. 
(3) 
SUMMARY ARGUMENT 
The Credit Union failed to initiate a suit for a deficiency 
judgment against Phillips within the time frame allowed by 
§57-1-32, supra, which allows three months from the date a 
non-judicial sale to establish a deficiency, if any. Thus, the 
total debt due to the Credit Union was extinguished on the date 
that the time ran for it to sue for a deficiency. 
ARGUMENT 
The facts admitted by the Credit Union in this case show 
that its trustee sold the property described in the Trust Deed in 
question at a non-judicial sale on April 29, 1986, and that said 
trustee bid on said property at said sale the sum of $90,000, an 
amount less than the total claimed to be due and owing by Phillips 
to the Credit Union at said time. That subsequent to the date of 
sale, the Credit Union's trustee caused the real property being 
the subject matter of the non-judicial foreclosure sale to be 
transferred to the Credit Union. That after the sale date, 
to-wit: April 29, 1986, more than three (3) months elapsed, 
during which the Credit Union failed to file an action to 
establish a deficiency judgment against Phillips as required by 
§57-1-32, supra. 
In order for the Credit Union to establish Phillips 
liability for any additional amounts due, it was required to 
comply strictly with the requirements of §57-1-32, supra, and in 
(4) 
the event the Credit Union failed to comply with said section it 
is precluded from pursuing any other remedy, §57-1-32, supra, 
gave the Credit Union one remedy and one remedy only, and its 
failure to comply therewith prohibits it from collecting 
additional funds from Phillips from any sources whatsoever. 
Because the Credit Union failed to establish a deficiency amount 
due and owing to it during the period of time allowed by the 
statute, any debt that might have been established to be due the 
Credit Union was automatically extinguished by the time running as 
provided by the statute and no money was thereafter due it from 
Phillips. 
The Credit Union elected to proceed under the statute in 
question and cannot now abandon said statute in an attempt to 
collect on some other theory. To allow such would deprive 
Phillips of the opportunity to protect and defend his rights under 
the statute and it would allow all creditors in the Credit Union's 
position to overreach and treat their debtors unfairly, Concepts, 
Inc. v. First Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 
1160-61 (Utah, 1987). 
§57-1-32, supra, is clear and unequivocal and provides that 
the Credit Union must within three (3) months after the 
non-judicial sale of real property under a trust deed, file an 
action to establish a deficiency against Phillips. Said statute 
further requires that the complaint must set forth specific 
(5) 
allegations as follows, to-wit: the entire amount of the 
indebtedness, the amount for which such property was sold at the 
non-judicial sale, and what the party attempting to attain a 
deficiency believes the fair market value of the property sold was 
at the date of said sale. Said statute further provides that the 
Court before rendering judgment shall find the fair market value 
of the property at the date it was sold and said Court may not 
render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of 
indebtedness, with interest, costs and expenses of sale, including 
trustee and attorney fees, exceeds the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the sale, Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 
P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah, 1988). The Credit Union failed to do 
any of the foregoing and therefore it is not entitled to any 
deficiency because it failed to establish one as required by law. 
The statute in question was interpreted in Cox v Green, 696 
P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985), wherein this Supreme Court stated that the 
statute provided the exclusive remedy for securing a deficiency 
judgment following a non-judicial sale of real property under a 
trust deed thereby precluding the pursuance of any other remedy 
once the sale has been made. 
In the instant case the purchase of the Tooele property by 
the Credit Union's trustee at the non-judicial foreclosure sale 
and the subsequent failure of the Credit Union to file suit for a 
deficiency within the time period allowed by statute constituted 
(6) 
an acceptance by the Credit Union of the property foreclosed upon 
as full settlement of any indebtedness due the Credit Union from 
Phillips. The transaction under the statute amounts to nothing 
more than the Credit Union accepting the property as payment in 
full for the debt as if Phillips had written a check for the full 
amount claimed to be due and owing to Credit Union on the 
indebtedness at the time of the sale. 
The other matters raised by the Credit Union in its brief 
are irrelevant to the issue on appeal in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case the Credit Union failed to comply with the 
statutory requirements relating to non-judicial foreclosure sales 
as said statute pertains to deficiency judgments and by reason 
thereof the Credit Unionfs appeal must also fail and the judgment 
of the District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of February, 1990. 
(7) 
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